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How can pricing and reimbursement policies improve affordable access to medicines? 
Lessons learned from European countries 
Short title: Lessons from pricing and reimbursement policies in Europe 
Key points for Decision Makers: 
 European countries apply different pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement 
policies. 
 These policies are frequently assessed against their financial consequences and their 
ability to contain costs but less so in terms of access to medicines. Policies should be 
accompanied by regular evaluations, facilitated by the use of the appropriate 
methodology and access to the relevant data. 
 There appears to be a need for additional changes beyond traditional pharmaceutical 
pricing and reimbursement policies. Collaborative approaches (e.g. between 
countries or between regulatory authorities, pricing and reimbursement agencies) and 
more transparency in terms of real medicine prices, R+D costs and medicines in the 
pipeline are considered as possible pathways for the future. 
Abstract  
The paper discusses pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in European 
countries with regard to their ability to ensure affordable access to medicines. A frequently 
applied pricing policy is external price referencing. While it provides some benchmark for 
policy-makers and has shown to be able to generate savings, it may also contribute to delay 
in product launch in countries where medicine prices are low. Value-based pricing has been 
proposed as a policy that promotes access while rewarding useful innovation, however 
implementing it has proven quite challenging. For high-priced medicines, managed-entry 
agreements are increasingly used. These agreements allow policy-makers to manage 
uncertainty and obtain lower prices. They can also facilitate earlier market access in case of 
limited evidence about added therapeutic value of the medicine. However, these agreements 
raise transparency concerns due to the confidentiality clause. Tendering as used in the 
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hospital and offpatent outpatient sectors has proven to reduce medicine prices but it requires 
a robust framework and appropriate design with clear strategic goals in order to prevent 
shortages. These pricing and reimbursement policies are supplemented by the widespread 
use of Health Technology Assessment to inform decision-making, and by strategies to 
improve the uptake of generics, and also biosimilars. While European countries have been 
implementing a set of policy options, there is a lack of thorough impact assessments of 
several pricing and reimbursement policies on affordable access. Increased cooperation 
between authorities, experience sharing, and improving transparency on price information, 
including the disclosure of confidential discounts, are opportunities to address current 
challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, access to essential medicines has become an issue even in the wealthiest 
parts of Europe. In particular, the proliferation of high-priced medicines has pushed the issue 
of access to new medicines high on the policy agenda of all European countries, including in 
high-income economies [1-4]. At the same time, pharmaceutical spending is rising again, 
boosted in 2014 by the entry of new hepatitis C treatments [5]. Apart from prices, payers are 
increasingly concerned that some of these high-priced medicines only deliver limited 
therapeutic added benefits to patients [6-8]. 
While in most European countries all residents benefit from comprehensive coverage of 
health care costs, including costs related to medicines [9] and a major part of spending on 
medicines comes from public progammes, there is considerable variation in public funding on 
medicines between countries [10]. In addition, important variation in access to medicines 
exists between European countries, in particular between Western and Eastern countries. 
This is due to differences in marketing of medicines and their inclusion in national 
reimbursement lists, country’s gross domestic product, government expenditure on health, 
and also due to medicine prices and utilization (for further information on differences 
between countries related to availability [11-14], prices [5, 15-22] and utilization [23-30] of 
medicines see A1 in the Supplementary Materials). 
This paper provides a critical discussion of selected pharmaceutical reimbursement and 
pricing policies used in European countries and their ability to ensure affordable access to 
medicines. In line with existing frameworks [31-34], availability (marketing of a medicine in 
national markets) and indicators such as inclusion of medicines in reimbursement, public 
spending and medicine prices are considered as key determinants for affordable access to 
medicines. This understanding of affordable access to medicines also fits within the 
Universal Health Coverage and access to medicines target under Sustainable Development 
Goal 3 on Good health [35]. 
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Over the last three decades a number of initiatives have been developed to better 
characterize and measure the situation in countries and globally on the access to, regulation 
and use of medicines. These initiatives were developed in collaboration with numerous 
international and national organisations, academia, experts and fed with country experiences 
and often consolidated in WHO documents and guidelines [36]. They normally contain a set 
of structure, process, output and outcome indicators. In parallel many countries developed 
and used their own set of indicators to more specifically measure their national situation. The 
latest effort has been the development of set of 100 indicators, jointly by WHO and the World 
Bank to monitor progress on UHC, and this also contains some indicators across disease 
programmes as well as health system development [37]. 
The presented findings are based on an iterative search of the published and grey literature, 
using the bibliographic database PubMed, alongside Google Scholar and reviewing 
reference lists of flagship reports (e.g. a WHO Euro report on access to new medicines [3] 
and the WHO Priority Medicines for Europe and the World report, with the background 
chapter on pricing and reimbursement [11]). The literature search was complemented by the 
input from co-authors, all expert on the topic. Key search terms were the names of the 
pricing and reimbursement policies, as listed in the WHO report on access to new medicines 
[3]; searches were run between 25 May and 26 June 2016. When co-authors learned about 
relevant updated literature that was published later, this was also included in the first draft 
and revised paper. In order to have access to up-to-date information about policies in Europe 
that might not have been covered in literature, we included descriptive information about the 
existence of the discussed policies in Europe as of 2016 based on information obtained from 
policy surveys done with representatives of compentent authorities involved the 
Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information /PPRI network. 
To keep the review focused, this paper focuses on key policies out of the larger menu of 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies, as described in literature [3, 18, 38]. 
Policies included were those commonly been applied in European countries for several years, 
some of which (e.g. health technology assessment, external price referencing) have also 
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been intensively discussed in literature. In addition, recently introduced policies (e.g. 
managed-entry agreements, horizon scanning) that have been seen as major policy options 
in the menu of policies for high-priced medicines are included [3]. For definitions of key 
policies used see Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
2. Health technology assessments to inform pricing and reimbursement policies 
In Europe, decisions about reimbursement of medicines are taken at the national level. 
These are often implemented through positive or negative lists, even in health systems with 
competiting health insurers such as the Netherlands or Switzerland. Patients usually have to 
contribute to the costs of outpatient medicines; however various mechanisms exist to protect 
patients from excessive out-of-pocket payments [9]. Typically, marketing authorisations’ 
holders have to file an application if they want their medicine to be included in the positive list 
of reimbursed medicines. European countries use one of the following processes to make 
reimbursement and pricing decisions: In some countries, health technology assessment 
(HTA) is used to inform reimbursement and/or pricing decisions (e.g. France, Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Switzerland). In other countries, HTA (and appraisal) results in a decision to 
reimburse a new product (with or without restrictions) or to reject funding (e.g. England, 
Sweden, Norway; see A2 on different models). 
In many European countries, HTA is used either systematically for all new medicines or only 
for those raising specific problems such as high prices, uncertain clinical benefits or high 
budget impact. There are usually more than one or two HTA institutions per country (for an 
overview see [3]). HTA is focused on the assessment of clinical benefits but may also  
include economic aspects. It determines the therapeutic value of a medicine, the added 
therapeutic value by comparison to existing treatments, and frequently its cost-effectiveness. 
Medicines which are more effective than existing comparators can get a higher price, while 
others tend to be priced at a similar or lower level. Medicines used in the treatment of very 
severe diseases and/or orphan diseases without treatment alternatives are very often 
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accepted for reimbursement even though they do not meet the cost-effectiveness threshold 
[39]. This suggests that cost-effectiveness is not the only criteria taken into account by 
decision makers and also that the negotiation power of payers is very limited in such cases. 
HTA is a tool to support prioritization, with the aim to help policy-makers obtain better value 
for money. This would arguably ensure a more rational and targeted investment of funds, 
thus contributing to access to cost-effective medicines. A study that compared HTA and 
internal price referencing suggested that HTA appears to be the superior strategy for 
obtaining value for money because it addresses both price and appropriate indications for 
the use of the medicine and the relation between additional value and additional costs [40]. 
Overall, no clear pattern of the impact of HTA on prices could be determined [41]. Still, 
policy-makers consider HTA as one of the two key tools (the other one being managed-entry 
agreements) to deal with new high-priced medicines [42]. 
3 Selected pricing and reimbursement policies 
Most European countries regulate the prices of medicines via a mix of instruments, applied to 
different market segments (outpatient / inpatient medicines, onpatent / offpatent, innovative / 
medicines with no added therapeutic value, etc.). Even though, all these instruments have 
advantages and drawbacks that are described below, it is difficult to isolate the impact of any 
single policy on availability and affordability of medicines since countries typically use several 
of these policies simultaneously. 
3.1 External price referencing 
All EU Member States but two (Sweden, United Kingdom) refer to the price in other countries 
to set the price of medicines in their own country, a practice known as external price 
referencing (EPR). EPR is also used in further European countries (e.g. Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland, Turkey) [43]. However, the scope, relevance and methodological design vary 
across countries. In Denmark, for instance, EPR only applies in the hospital sector. In 
Germany, EPR exists in the legislation but is not used in practice [43]. EPR is typically 
applied to regulate the price of new products, less often in offpatent markets. This 
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international price comparison offers a reference, or benchmark, for policy-makers, to 
understand where the prices proposed by industry for their country are relatively ranked. The 
price information achieved through EPR is frequently seen as a starting point for public 
payers to further negotiate and conclude agreements to reach a more acceptable, and 
somewhat affordable price that will be funded. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) described EPR as a 
policy that is ‘readily gameable by the pharmaceutical industry and – by reducing firms’ 
willingness to price to market – contributes to access and affordability problems’ [44]. EPR 
incentivizes marketing authorization holders to launch medicines first in countries with higher 
prices, and delay, or not to launch, in lower-priced countries. This is in order to not reduce 
the medicine’s international reference price [38, 45-53]. Countries with lower prices or lower 
market volume were found to have fewer medicines available and longer delays in medicines 
launches [48, 54, 55]. Pharmaceutical companies have systematically delayed dossier 
submissions in Belgium in order to avoid that the lower Belgian prices affect other European 
countries [56]. While studies highlighted the ability of EPR to negatively impact the 
availability of medicines on the market, it remains difficult to isolate the impact of EPR from 
other factors, such as ‘parallel trade’ (see Table 1) that is a legal practice within the 
European Union [49, 57] or pricing regulation in Germany and Italy that allow free pricing for 
some medicines in the first year to improve earlier market access in their country but thus 
signal a high price to other EPR-applying countries. Overall, available literature on the impact 
of EPR is limited [41, 48]. Evaluations focused on cost-containment, showing how EPR was 
able to contribute to savings under specific conditions [21, 58-61], whereas aspects such as 
availability and uptake have not been sufficiently addressed. One study showed that, using a 
limited sample of new patented medicines, EPR-applying countries had, in general, lower list 
prices than countries not using EPR [60]. 
To mitigate the negative impact of EPR (and parallel trade) on availability in lower-income 
countries in Europe, it has been argued that public payers could keep a high ‘list price’ and 
get confidential discounts through product-specific agreements [46, 62]. This would allow 
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industry to provide medicines at lower prices to low-income countries without negatively 
impacting the average reference price. While confidential arrangements (frequently 
subsumed under the umbrella term of managed-entry agreements/MEA, see below) have 
increasingly been used, also by higher-income countries as an instrument to ensure 
affordable access to medicines [3, 63], there is no evidence that access has improved in 
lower-income countries since they continue to experience delayed and limited availability. On 
the negative side, confidential discounts and rebates are blurring the price transparency of 
the market, and they limit the ability of payers to determine what a ‘reasonable and fair’ price 
would be. 
3.2 Value-based pricing 
Value-based pricing (VBP) consists in setting a price according the added therapeutic value 
of a new product by comparison to existing treatments.  Seeking to pay for medicines in 
relation to the ‘value’ they bring to their own health system and society has been considered 
as one approach to ensure value in pharmaceutical spending (static efficiency) and to send 
appropriate signals to companies for further investments in R&D (dynamic efficiency)[44].  
In a narrow approach, VBP (in the context of the English National Health Service /NHS) is 
defined as ‘(the price) that ensures that the expected health benefits [of a new technology] 
exceed the health predicted to be displaced elsewhere in the NHS, due to their additional 
cost’ [64]. It thus relies on cost-effectiveness analysis and the setting of an ICER threshold 
beyond which a new medicine is not funded. Sweden has such a ‘real’ VBP system. 
Introduced in 2002, pricing and reimbursement processes are completely integrated, and 
eligibility for reimbursement is assessed against three criteria: the human value principle to 
guard against discrimination of individuals, the need and solidarity principle that gives priority 
to those in greatest need, and the cost-effectiveness principle [11, 65]. 
Applying a broader approach, any policy linking the price of a medicine to its added 
therapeutic value can be considered within the category of value-based pricing. With such a 
definition, many European countries use such policies [3, 39]. 
 9 
However, value-based pricing has proven difficult to implement, especially in therapeutic 
areas where no alternative treatment is available and patients suffer from severe life-
threatening or debilating disease, such as oncology or rare diseases. In such cases, payers 
face a strong public pressure and often accept to pay high prices for limited clinical benefits. 
To some extent, it can be argued that the value of such products cannot be reduced to 
clinical benefits and some analysts have developed frameworks to take other criteria into 
account, such as the absence of alternative treatment for orphan diseases for instance [66]. 
However, such frameworks do not provide any simple rule to set the price of a new medicine. 
A major argument for using a value-based pricing policy is that it might create an incentive 
for the development of products that generate more added value [11, 65]. It could also 
support a new approach of policy-makers to signal more explicitly their priorities which 
medicines would be reimbursed if they are developed as proposed in the WHO Priority 
Medicines for Europe and the World study in 2004 [67]. Currently, the pharmaceutical policy 
framework appears to be supply-driven, and a more pro-active approach has been 
suggested [68, 69]. In principle, medicines with perceived high value are likely to obtain 
higher prices, providing a reward for innovation, which might explain the preference of the 
industry for this policy [70]. However, VBP also presents opportunities to industry for ‘gaming’, 
in particular related to the choice of the comparator and the threshold [53]. For instance, a 
manufacturer will try to avoid genericised molecule as a comparator, even if this means 
positioning their product as a second or third line therapy. In such a case, the population 
target will be smaller but the price premium will be set in relation to the price of an on-patent 
medicine. In addition, where an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold is published, marketing 
authorization holders tend to price up to the threshold [71]. 
It has been argued that VBP would encourage access to needed medicines, in line with the 
prioritization of policy-makers. Still, it can also result in limited, or delayed, access due to the 
resource-intensive and time-intensive character of underlying value assessments, and 
discussions between the authority and the manufacturer on different perceptions of value 
[53]. Until now, VBP has been proposed as a logical and fair policy to promote access as 
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well as reward useful innovation, however implementing this policy has proven very 
challenging. 
3.3 Managed-entry agreement 
European countries have increasingly been using managed-entry agreements (MEA) to deal 
with high-priced medicines and uncertainty around the medicine’s value [3]. These 
agreements take many forms such as simple confidential discounts and price-volume 
agreements in financial-based schemes (non-health outcome-based schemes). These also 
include more sophisticated performance-based (or health outcome-based) schemes, where 
the final price of a product is linked to health outcomes observed in real life. Performance-
based schemes include outcome guarantees (i.e. an agreement where the manufacturer 
provides rebates, refunds, or price adjustments if the product fails to meet the agreed 
outcome target), coverage with evidence development (i.e. reimbursement where additional 
data gathered in the context of clinical care would further clarify the impact of the medicines, 
and patient eligibility linked to patient registries to measure post-marketing clinical outcomes). 
In some countries, the existence of such agreements is not disclosed to the public (e.g. in 
France) while in others the existence and the content of the agreements is public (e.g. 
Scotland, England, Belgium). In all cases, the final discount to payers is unknown. The 
EMINet survey as of 2013 [72] confirmed other research [73-75] that MEA were particularly 
used for specific (high-priced) indications such as cancer and that some European countries 
(e.g. Italy, UK) used them at a much higher scale than others. It also showed that most 
countries opted for financial MEA that are easier to handle, than performance-based MEA 
[76]. Since that study, more MEA have been implemented for new products, and even 
European countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) that had not applied them before started to use 
them [3, 77]. 
For patients and industry, MEA are an opportunity to facilitate early market access to 
medicines, even if added therapeutic value has not yet been fully proven. They also allow for 
price discrimination without changing list prices. For policy-makers, MEA are a tool to 
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manage uncertainty [78] and obtain lower prices than the list prices; how much lower is 
unknown as the prices are confidential. When performance-based MEA have been set up, 
together with patients registries, for instance, this allows collecting real-life clinical data that 
are needed to assess the treatment effect and take a more sound decision based on more 
robust evidence. Still, even if updated data may urge for a discontinuation of funding (at high 
prices) of a medicine under a MEA, it might be difficult in reality to implement it if 
expectations of patients have been created [79]. Due to public pressure, funding may be 
continued, as observed in the cases of agalsidase alfa and agalsidase beta for Fabry 
disease and alglucosidase alfa for Pompe disease in the Netherlands [80].  
The confidentiality of MEA is a major drawback, particularly given the widespread use of 
EPR. As a result, European countries refer to the official list price of a high-priced medicine 
that is under MEA in several countries. It was argued that by opting for MEA payers implicitly 
accepting high (list) prices [81]. 
Despite continuously wide-spread use of MEA, there is some [82] but comparably little 
knowledge about their functioning nor results in terms of improving affordability and access. 
3.4 Tendering 
In Europe, tendering has traditionally been applied in the hospital sector, at the level of 
individual hospitals and hospital groups, or through voluntary pooling of regional procurement 
at national level by procurement agencies (in Denmark and Norway) acting on behalf all 
public hospitals [83-85]. In the outpatient offpatent sector, some European countries (e.g. 
Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Romania) have implemented tender systems and 
auction elements to enhance competition (cluster-tendering) and thus achieve lower 
medicine prices [86-88]. 
National procurement agencies in Denmark (AMGROS) and Norway (LIS) have been 
reporting efficiency gains and lower prices through their centralised hospital tendering 
compared to other countries [83-85]. This is in part attributed to the shift of the balance of 
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power in favour of the national procurement agency that procures for a much larger market 
as well as use of new types of tendering procedures. 
Tendering in the outpatient sector has also proven its ability to considerably reduce prices 
through competition [88-90]. Concerns have been raised that, if tender pushed prices too low, 
the sustainability of the generic industry would suffer, and some companies could withdraw 
from the market, this reducing competition in the longer term [91]. However, a recent study 
did not find any evidence for Dutch offpatent market that tendered medicines would be more 
affected by shortages than non-tendered medicines [88]. Still, in case of shortages of 
tendered medicines alternative medicines might also not be available or only at substantially 
higher prices. Tendering requires a clear and robust framework, as apparently observed for 
the tender-like system in the Danish outpatient system [88], particularly aiming at keeping 
several suppliers in the market, including backup strategies to deal with possible supply 
problems. If tendering is not well designed and based on a sound framework, there are risks 
of neutralization of savings (lower prices for one medicine are met with higher prices for 
similar medicines), of stakeholders going to court to challenge the legal provisions and the 
non-availability of medicines. These developments were observed in Belgium which, as a 
result, withdrew its tendering policy for offpatent medicines [88, 92]. 
3.5 Generic policies 
European countries have increasingly been implementing generic policies [93, 94] (see 
Table 1 for definitions of generic policies listed below). They are particularly aimed at 
ensuring swift market entry of high-quality generics, bring down the prices of multi-source 
products (off-patent originator medicines and generic medicines) and improve generics’ 
acceptance and uptake of lower-priced medicines. As a result, generic policies are 
considered as a valuable instrument to generate savings for public payers which can be used 
for affording more expensive medicines and for treating more patients. European countries 
use a mix of policies related to pricing, reimbursement and enhancement of uptake of 
generics. 
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Twenty-two EU Member States (as of 2016) use ‘internal reference pricing’, i.e. maximum 
reimbursement amounts for clusters of medicines. In 9 of these countries, clusters of 
medicines with the same active ingredient have been established, while in 13 countries a 
reference price is applied to therapeutic substitutes (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands) [95]. 
Most EU Member States set the price of generics in relation to originator prices, whereas 
fewer countries (e.g. Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK) exclusively rely on 
competition [96]. As explained above, tendering, or an auction-like system for generics, is 
used by some European countries for the procurement of generics in the inpatient and, to a 
lesser extent, in the outpatient sector. Generic substitution by the pharmacist is allowed in 24 
EU Member States and even mandatory in ten (2016 data [95]). Doctors are encouraged to 
prescribe in International Non-Proprietary Name (INN) in 25 EU Member States, and even 
mandated to do so in 10 of them [95]. These demand-side measures are supplemented by 
education and information activities targeted at patients and health professionals. Financial 
incentives are also applied, but to a far lesser extent. For instance, different co-payment 
rates for originator and generic medicines had been in place in Portugal and were abolished 
[97], and Austria ran a pilot of lower co-payment in one health insurance fund [98]. In recent 
times, more countries are moving towards mandatory generic substitution and mandatory 
INN prescribing instead of the voluntary form they had introduced earlier [99]. This may be in 
fact an approach to ensure better enforcement of the measures. 
As a result, several European countries have been successful in bringing down generic 
prices and increasing their generic market share even if, apart from a few countries 
(Germany, the United Kingdom, Slovak Republic and the Netherlands) generic uptake is 
lower in Europe than in the United States and generic prices in European countries tend to 
be higher than in the US [100]. Overall, competitive pricing policies, including tendering, as 
used in some Nordic European countries, appear to be more successful than other, more 
regulated generic policies in reducing the price levels of generics as well as of competitor 
originators as well as increasing generics’ uptake, in particular if coupled them with demand-
side measures [96, 101]. The quality of generics is ensured in the EU Member States and 
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neighbouring European countries, but lack of trust into the quality of generics by patients and 
even health professionals is still an issue [94, 102, 103]. It has been noted, e.g. by the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry of the European Commission [104] that benefits of generics 
were not always fully realised because of delays in market entry. Industry strategies of 
‘evergreening’ have been observed, trying to link intellectual property issues to marketing 
authorization, pricing and reimbursement of medicines [105, 106].  
There is a large body of literature, including on European countries, that confirmed the 
savings’ potential through lower prices by implementing generics policies [101, 107-109]. 
Evidence shows that generics have contributed to increased utilization of medicines [101, 
110]. In contrast to other policies described above, generics polices describe an area for 
which evidence on their effectiveness to ensure affordable access is available.  
3.6 Biosimilar medicines’ policies 
Given the high prices of new biological medicines, authorities and payers have high 
expectations regarding offpatent successors [3]. At the time of writing, 20 biosimilar 
medicines have been approved in Europe [111], with substantial cost savings [112], 
compared to two biosimilar medicines in the US [113]. Studies about the clinical impact of 
switches from originators to biosimilars are being performed in European countries [114]. 
The recently published first results of the Norwegian NOR SWITCH study suggested that a 
switch from originator infliximab to biosimilar infliximab is safe [115]. 
Policies to encourage the uptake of biosimilars differ from policies to encourage to uptake of 
generic medicines because of the perception that biosimilar medicines should not be treated 
as ‘generics’ [116]. For instance, prices of biosimilars are linked to originator prices, the 
required difference between the biosimilar and the originator price is lower compared to 
generics (e.g., 30% for generics and 15% for biosimilars in Croatia; and 50% for generics 
and 30% for biosimilars in Lithuania) [117]. While generic substitution has been widely 
implemented in European countries, this is not the case for biosimilar substitution at 
pharmacy level [118, 119]. Though European countries seem to be advanced related to 
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biosimlar medicines compared to the rest of the world, overall governments in European 
countries appear to be still struggeling to develop the best policy option mix for best 
benefitting from biosimilar medicines. At the same time, there is the best-practice example of 
Norway that combines several policies (pricing, uptake enhancement, education): In the 
areas of biological and biosimilar medicines, Norway has been following up on its successful 
policy of tendering through a public procurement agency for medicines used in public 
hospitals [120] and closely works with the clinicians to educate and encourage them to 
prescribe the tendered, lower-priced medicines. Figures about price reductions that Norway 
achieved in tenders are impressive (e.g. discounts of up to 80 percent between originator 
and biosimilar medicines)[121], and this is used to ensure that in total more patients can be 
treated. 
4. Suggestions for improvement 
European countries developed a range of pricing and reimbursement policies, with the aim to 
ensure affordable access to medicines, protect citizens against financial hardship and to 
generate public savings and/or to contain costs. Despite several achievements, countries 
continue to struggle to meet policy objectives. This is in particular the case in the context of 
market entry of new high-priced medicines. Policy-makers in Europe identified an imbalance 
of (negotiation) power in the pharmaceutical sector, as stated in the ‘Council conclusions on 
strengthening the balance in the pharmaceutical systems in the EU and its Member 
States‘ published under the Dutch EU Presidency in June 2016 [122]. In order to address this 
perceived imbalance, some new approaches, including cooperation between countries and 
between different agencies (e.g. responsible for marketing authorization, HTA body, pricing 
and reimubursement authorities), improved information sharing and data generation as well 
as revised incentives and frameworks, have been discussed and also partially been 
implemented in European countries. They aim to improve capacity, knowledge and 
negotiation power of governments. They are thus intended to enable payers to take more 
informed decisions and to achieve negotiation results with industry that lead to a more 
affordable access to medicines for patients while keeping a ‘healthy market’. These 
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approaches are not policies per se, but rather processes and tools to support and further 
develop pharmaceutical policy. 
4.1 Cooperation and stakeholder involvement 
During the last decade, European countries have seen increased cross-national cooperation 
activities between public authorities at technical level, using platforms such as the Network of 
Competent Authorities on Pricing and Reimbursement (CAPR) and the Phamaceutical 
Pricing and Reimbursement Information (PPRI) network (information on these and further 
networks see Appendix A3 in the Supplementary Materials). 
These networks mainly serve for building capacity and improving the exchange of 
experiences between authorities. Any further-reaching collaboration beyond information 
sharing, such as joint negotiations or joint procurement, were for long not considered as 
feasible policy options for EU Member States which take the decisions about medicines’ 
prices and funding at their national levels. The sofosbuvir case, however, appeared to have 
been a trigger for a change. A French initiative in 2014 sought collaborative approaches with 
other European countries to get a lower price for sofosbuvir but it was not successful. Some 
EU Member States hoped that the specific ‘Joint Procurement Agreement (JPA) of medical 
countermeasures’ as of 2014 [123] (i.e. procurement of vaccines, for instance, to be 
prepared for an outbreak of a serious cross-border threat to health such as a pandemic) 
could be extended to a joint procurement of high-priced medicines against cancer, multiple 
sclerosis, and orphan medicines. But the European Commission clarified that this would be 
beyond of the scope of this agreement [43]. Collaborative approaches such as joint 
negotiations and procurements were sought since Member States wanted to increase their 
negotiation power in order to achieve lower prices, in return for – the predictability of – larger 
volumes for industry, and also to achieve earlier and improved access to medicines for 
lower-priced countries and small markets that were not supplied with some high-priced 
medicines. In this respect, the issue of ‘fair prices’ was also discussed since prices in lower-
priced European countries were found to be as high as in higher-priced countries and thus 
unaffordable ([5], see also Appendix A1). Discussions also included considerations about a 
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differential pricing policy within the EU in order to ensure that medicine prices were better 
linked to the economic situation of a country. A study [43] commissioned by the European 
Commission to explore the feasibility of differential pricing in Europe concluded that a fully-
fledged differential pricing system would require addressing major obstacles, including 
measures to prevent leakage due to parallel trade and the wide-spread use of EPR, and 
political commitment of the EU Member States to agreeing on principles and mechanisms. 
While this far-reaching EU-wide cooperation appeared not to be implementable in the short 
term, a number of the countries started to cooperate in this area. For instance, in 2015, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg announced a cooperation initiative aiming to 
jointly negotiate with pharmaceutical companies [124], and another country (Austria) joined 
this cooperation platform (Beneluxa) in 2016 [125]. These collaborations appear to be at 
early stages and thus cannot be assessed. Joint negotiations are expected to strengthen the 
purchasing power of the collaborating countries; and technical cooperation in areas of Health 
Technology Assessment or horizon scanning is planned that helps governments get 
improved evidence base for more informed decisions in a more resource-efficient way 
compared to doing this individually and separately. 
In addition, joining forces in the fragmented pharmaceutical systems in Euroopean countries 
also requires vertical (cross-agency) cooperation in countries and at European level. In order 
to overcome working in ‘silos’ at different stages of a medicine’s life-cycle, awareness has 
been raised for enhancing national and international cooperation between different 
authorities along the management of market entry of new medicines (i.e. regulatory 
authorities, HTA organisations, pricing authorities, reimbursement agencies), possibly with 
the involvement of other stakeholders like industry, patients and academia [3]. Supported by 
a legal framework and EU funding, EUNetHTA that is a large network of HTA organisations 
and public authorities, with the involvement of external stakeholders such as industry, has 
already been active for nearly a decade [126]. Since 2010, the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) has been offering parallel scientific advice with HTA bodies that allows 
pharmaceutical companies to receive simultaneous feedback from both regulators (EMA) 
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and HTA bodies on their development plans for new medicines [127] and to be better able to 
respond to expectations of regulators and payers. Furthermore, the project of the Adaptive 
Pathways (adaptive licensing) of EMA foresees a staged approach to the collection of 
evidence and consequent licence adaptations [128]. However, it is still in the pilot phase, and 
the impact on pricing and reimbursement is not clear. 
The involvement of patients, and, even more broader, of citizens in priority-setting for health 
and social care, including aspects of pricing and reimbursement policies, has been urged for 
several years [67]. Patients are the ‘experts’ for their diseases, and they can bring in aspects 
of quality of life and different perspectives about medicines, e.g. on their observed and 
expected impracticalities [129]. Despite the acknowledged importance of patient involvement, 
this has been hardly implemented in the area of pricing and reimbursement in European 
countries [130]. This might also be linked to authorities’ lack of knowledge and experience of 
how to address patients and integrate them in committees, for instance. Few examples in 
this field include activities of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in 
England [129] and the Scottish Medicines Agency [131] that have been involving the public in 
their processes. 
4.2 Transparency 
While pricing and reimbursement decisions are, as described, the responsibility of the 
national competent authorities in the EU Member States, the EU Transparency Directive 
[132] obliges Member States to comply with defined specifications of the processes, 
including time-lines and a clear definition of criteria taken into account to make 
reimbursement and pricing decisions and of processes (e.g., justifications of the decisions, 
possibility for marketing authorization holders to appeal). This Directive impose obligations to 
competent authorities, not companies, and confidential arrangements between payers and 
companies do not fall under the scope of this regulation. 
As shown, confidential discounts and further managed-entry agreements have been 
increasingly used, particularly for high-priced medicines. Industry has been arguing that, 
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given the widespread use of external price referencing, price discrimination through 
confidential discounts was the only way to ensure affordable access to medicines (see also 
[133]). Policy-makers have increasingly become aware about the impact of their 
confidentiality agreements to other countries, but they are in a kind of prisoners’ dilemma [43]. 
In recent years, authorities [134] increasingly joined the call of researchers and international 
institutions [3, 16, 48] for more price transparency. A disclosure of discounts would allow 
EPR-applying countries to refer to actual, thus lower prices and contain costs by not 
overpaying. But even payers that do not apply EPR, or only as supplementary policy, 
reported that knowledge about real prices would be helpful to have some kind of benchmark 
for decision-making (information provided by PPRI network members). However, no 
European country has pioneered in disclosing discounted prices [43], also for the concern 
that lower or no discounts would be offered by industry. As a first step, since 2016 Austria 
has been labelling the medicines in its reimbursement list for which a discount agreement 
has been arranged, without disclosing the extent of the discount. Such practice is also 
common in Australia [135]. While a routine disclosure of discounts does not appear feasible 
for European countries at the time being, a possible solution could lie in cooperative 
approaches of public authorities, as discussed in the previous section and also encouraged 
by the Council Conclusions in June 2016 [122] (‘enhancing voluntary cooperation between 
Member States aimed at greater transparency’). Even the cooperation of few countries can 
be expected to have an impact: given the improved knowledge and capacity of the 
cooperating countries, prices will likely reduce, and due to stronger purchasing power and 
larger markets in case of joint negotiations or even joint procurement, access can arguably 
be improved. Another option for countries could be to assume a certain extent of discount 
and thus insist on lowering the ‘list price’ that would be used everywhere as a starting point 
for negotiation. 
Discussions about transparency are not only about price transparency and disclosure of 
discounts. To be prepared for new medicines and to develop appropriate strategies to 
manage their market entry (including taking priorisation in resource-restrainted settings), 
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public authories need to know which medicines are in the pipeline. Horizon scanning and 
forecasting tended to be implemented rather as an academic exercise disconnected to the 
policy practice [3]. The horizon scanning project in Veneto (Italy) [136], the English National 
Horizon Scanning Centre [137] and activities at regional level Stockholm County Council in 
Sweden [138] were among the rare exeptions in Europe where horizon scanning was used to 
support decision-making of public authorities. While horizon scanning is not a tool to 
immediately ensure access to medicines or bring down prices, it surely supports the 
prioritization process. The sofosbuvir case to which policy-makers and payers of several 
countries were not prepared [81] could be seen as a trigger, and some countries (e.g. 
Norway, France) started building horizon scanning systems [3]. Also, above-mentioned 
cooperation platforms such as Beneluxa or the Nordic Pharmaceutical Forum aim to work 
together on horizon scanning [125, 139]. 
Furthermore, long-lasting discussions about knowledge of production costs, including 
research and development costs [69, 140], have also reached Europe. In some US states 
‘pharmaceutical cost transparency acts’ were passed in spring 2016. Under these acts, it is 
mandatory for manufacturers to disclose their production costs of some high-priced 
medicines [141]. However, no concrete steps regarding a disclosure of R + D costs have 
been yet implemented either in Europe or in the US. 
4.3 New funding models 
As access to new high-priced medicines has become a challenge for high-income countries 
in Europe as well, the ability of current pricing and reimbursement policies to ensure 
affordable access to medicines has been questioned. Incremental changes that are 
envisaged may not be enough to respond to all policy objectives, i.e. provide access, 
encourage innovation and ensure sustainability. There has been a call for new rules and 
frameworks, in particular new methods to develop and market medicines (by de-linking the 
price from the return on investment into R + D): While at global levels the WHO, policy-
advisers and academics have been discussing new models of funding R&D for many years 
[142-148], this debate has started in Europe only recently, fuelled by the Dutch Presidency of 
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the EU [4], the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance [149] and interventions at conferences 
(e.g. European Health Forum Gastein 2015 – statement by Josef Probst, Austrian Main 
Association of Social Security Institution, or the PPRI Conference 2015 [81]). In September 
2016, the UN High Level Panel on Access to Medicines report was published and also called 
for de-linking the R+D cost from the price of a medicine [150]. The Lancet Commission 
Essential Medicines for UHC goes one step further in calling for an Essential Medicines 
Patent Pool (EMPP) by which patent owner’s refusal to license an essential medicine to the 
EMPP would satisfy the condition for granting a compulsory licence [151]. A medicines 
patent pool provides a legal mechanism through which the availability of a generic medicine 
can be increased and negative effects of market monopolicies be reduced.   
Still within the scope of the current pricing and reimbursement framework, some European 
countries introduced funding models that aim bridging the hospital and ambulatory sectors. 
This was done in response to the fragmentation in health care systems (different payers 
responsible for funding medicines, e.g. outpatient medicines reimbursed by social health 
insurance and medicines in hospitals covered by hospitals or regional authorities). This set-
up incentivized payers to shift patients, treatments and thus costs between sectors. The 
transfer could have negative clinical outcomes, and in turn may even increase overall 
healthcare costs [152].  In the Netherlands, defined high-priced medicines used in hospitals 
are funded by the health insurers (instead out of the hospital budget). Since 2006, Norway 
has been increasingly transfering the funding responsibility for a selected number of 
medicines (TNF alpha inhibitors, medicines for the treatment of Multiple Sclerose, anti-
cancer medicines) to hospitals even if these medicines were used in the outpatient sector [3, 
83]. However, to the knowledge of the authors, impact assessments as to whether these new 
funding approaches were able to address the observed limitations have not been made. 
5. Conclusions  
The paper discussed selected pharmaceutical policies that aim to contribute to improve 
affordable access to medicines. The analysis concluded that there is an overall lack of 
evidence on the impact of pricing and reimbursement policies on affordable access in many 
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settings. This is partially due to the lack of a well-established methodological evaluation 
framework, and the challenges in attribution, demonstrating the causual relation between the 
implementation of a single policy and the observed results in medicines availability and 
affordability [153, 154]. Furthermore, access to relevant data is a common limitation [151, 
155].  
However, an exception are policies to promote generics where there is strong evidence on 
price reduction resulting into substantial savings that allow investing into treating overall 
more patients. As other work has shown [156], an important precondition is that generic 
medicines in fact are lower-priced than originators, quality assured and accepted by patients 
and health professionals. The entry of a number of biosimilars offers the opportunity to 
increase access to biological medicines and to contain expenditure. To take advantage of the 
the benefits offered by biosimilars, studies such as the NOR SWITCH study [115] are 
essential to build trust among the medical and patient communities on the safety of switching. 
Further, the analysis showed the relevance of tools that allow prioritization on which 
medicines (and patient groups) money should be spent not only in making them more 
affordable through pricing policies. There is a need for improved prioritazion techniques in 
HTA and evaluations, and for capacity-building of technical staff. Countries pioneering in this 
area could support other countries through sharing of methods and techniques. 
This analysis found that sharing information and exchanging experiences about policy 
implementation and procurement, including failures, between policy-makers is very beneficial 
for countries. This allows to take better informed decisions and to negotiate more 
strategically. Eventually, this could increase transparency around negotiated prices in case 
that cross-border collaborations agreed to jointly negotiate and procure. 
Our analysis, though limited to selected policies, covered both existing policies as well as 
discussions and initiatives for new models, including proposals for funding and incentivizing 
R + D and patent pooling. While we identified a strong interest of some policy-makers and 
Non-Governmental Organisations in more far-reaching changes, the analysis also showed 
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that there is still space for improvement in the development and implementation of traditional 
pricing and reimbursement policies, such as a better enforcement of demand-side measures 
to promote generic uptake (e.g. generic substitution) and methodological adaptions in 
external price referencing (e.g. related to country baskets). 
Regular reviews and evaluations of the impact of pricing and reimbursement policies, with 
subsequent adaption based on the findings, if necessary are critical to inform whether, or not, 
the policies were effective in achieving the intended aims (e.g. more affordable access to 
medicines). In addition, evaluations are necessary to determine areas for improvement 
including increase efficiencies. In particular, there is a need for impact assessments of 
managed-entry agreements, value-based pricing and HTA. 
While this paper was limited to European policies, the conclusions about the impacts of some 
of the discussed policies, and possible avenues for the future are also of relevance in the 
global context. 
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